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The prisoners dilemma on a stochastic non-growth network evolution model
Vasilis Hatzopoulos and Henrik Jeldtoft Jensen∗
Department of Mathematics, Imperial College, 180 Queen’s Gate, London SW7 2AZ, U.K.
We investigate the evolution of cooperation on a non - growth network model with death/birth
dynamics. Nodes reproduce under selection for higher payoffs in a prisoners dilemma game played
between network neighbours. The mean field characteristics of the model are explored and an
attempt is made to understand the size dependent behaviour of the model in terms of fluctuations
in the strategy densities. We also briefly comment on the role of strategy mutation in regulating
the strategy densties.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
In biology an organism is called an altruist, if its be-
haviour enhances the reproductive probability (fitness) of
another individual at the expense of its own. An altruist
then pays a cost c for its opponent to receive a benefit
b while a non altruist pays nothing and just receives the
benefit. Should such behaviours be genetically encoded
and if natural selection is solely interpreted as preserving
the traits that contribute to individual fitness, then al-
truistic behaviours should be at a selective disadvantage
with repsect to purely selfish ones. Darwin himself was
aware of this paradox which he saw in the proliferation
of sterile insect castes.
A mathematical integration of altruism into evolution-
ary theory did not appear until the 1960’s when Hamilton
proposed that under certain conditions altruism can be
favoured by natural selection if the recipient and donor
of the altruistic act are genetically related [1] a mecha-
nism coined kin selection. Genetically related individuals
have more common alleles than two individuals picked at
random, and whilst the donor of the altruistic act lowers
its reproductive chances by doing so it raises the fitness
of its relative who has a good chance of also carrying the
allele coding for altruistism. Thus Hamilton posited that
selection can also act as to increase an organism’s inclu-
sive fitness, comprised of the reproductive potential of an
individual plus its genetic relatives, and the family can be
seen as the seed from which altruistic behaviour grows.
Mathematically Hamiltons rule takes the form b
c
> 1
r
,
where c is the cost of altruism to the actor, b is the ben-
efit to the recipient and r is a coefficient measuring the
relatedness of the two. An important conceptual shift
included in this viewpoint is that selection acts not as to
preserve individual organisms but genes in a pool span-
ning whole populations. Trivers [2] proposed that altru-
ism can evolve if it is reciprocated even if the individuals
involved are not related. Group selection [3] holds that
altruistic behaviour can evolve if selection can act at the
level of the group, i.e. a population with more altruists
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will reproduce faster than a population with fewer altru-
ists. The idea remains controversial to this day mainly
due to the fact that altruistic groups are susceptible to
the invasion of cheaters.
Game theory, particularly in its evolutionary form first
introduced in [4] and [5], has proved to be a very use-
ful tool in studying the evolution of behaviour because
it fundamentally describes frequency dependent selec-
tion. The worth of a particular behaviour with regards
to selection depends on its frequency in the population
and thus the behaviour of others, an altruistic behaviour
can only be deemed adaptive if there is a sufficient fre-
quency of altruists. The prisoner’s dilemma game [6]
has been extensively used to model the evolution of co-
operation/altruism between non-related individuals. The
game describes an interaction between two players each
having two strategies available to them, to cooperate, c
or to defect d. A c − c outcome yields the payoff R for
both players while a d − d event will give both players
a payoff P . Should one player cooperate and the other
defect the cooperator will collect S and the defector T .
The payoffs are arranged such that T > R > P > S and
2R > T + S. In this setting it is always better to defect
irrespective of the other player’s choice . The dilemma
lies in that if both players defect they both receive P
instead of R should they have both cooperated. In the
evolutionary game theory setting strategies become phe-
notypes and payoffs become fitness. Games take place
between members of the population in a pairwise fashion
and the fittest phenotypes spread over the population.
In the 1980s Robert Axelrod organized tournaments
[7] whereby contestants were requested to submit strate-
gies to play the repeated prisoners dilemma against
each other for a finite but unknown number of times.
The strategies were recipes that specified the players
next move based on stored knowledge of the opponents
past moves. Strategies would then reproduce themselves
in proportion to their accumulated payoff after having
played with a representative sample of the population.
In this setting it was demonstrated that cooperation is
an evolutionary stable outcome through a process of reci-
procity as evident by the proliferation of the well known
tit-for-tat strategy. Tit-for-tat will coopearate until de-
fected against and will then keep defecting until the op-
ponent cooperates at which point it will switch back to
2cooperation. Reciprocity requires some sort of opponent
recognition mechanism (and thus advanced cognitive fac-
ulties) which was deemed sufficient but not necessary for
the evolution of cooperation.
The need for cognitive capacity was done away with
in [8] were pure c or d strategies occupied the points
of a two dimensional grid. The strategies would play
their grid neighbours tally their total score and then for
the next round copy the strategy of their highest scoring
neighbour. Cooperative elements could now survive on
the grid by forming clusters uninvadable by defecting el-
ements at their border. The need for memory was thus
replaced with spatial structure, much more prevalent in
the natural world then advanced cognitive capacity. Vari-
ations in the lattice connectivity, topology and strategy
update mechanism have since been extensively studied
( [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18],
[19], , [20], [21], [22]). Doing away with the need for
an update mechanism (and thus any semblance of cog-
nitive ability in the players/agents) and also introducing
stochastic dynamics the authors in [23] and [24] studied
different lattice topologies for pure strategy populations
evolving under the Moran process. This two step process
consists of a death event and a birth event (which can be
performed in any order). The death event involves the
removal of a randomly selected element while the birth
event occurs when the now vacant vertex gets colonized
by a copy of the highest scoring neighbour.
In this work we also employ a two step death/birth
process with the following differences. When an individ-
ual is removed all its associated edges are also deleted
from the system. When an individual is born, as a copy
of a stochastically chosen fit individual, links are created
between the newborn and other individuals through a
process controlled by three parameters. Thus the indi-
viduals dynamically create the network which is not a
pre-existing space to be colonized but an ever changing
relational web. Also after the death of a node any fit node
and not only its neighbours can parent an offspring which
implies that clustering is not necessarily the mechanism
for the evolution of cooperation in our work.
II. NETWORK DYNAMICS AND SELECTION
Before we introduce our algorithm consider a popula-
tion of size n = nc + nd with the strategies present in
relative abundances ρc =
nC
n
and ρd =
nD
n
. In the well
mixed scenario every pair of interactions in the popula-
tion is present, which permits us to write
Wc = ρcR+ ρdS (1)
Wc = ρcT + ρdP (2)
W = ρcWc + ρdWd (3)
for the fitness of a cooperator, defector and the mean
fitness respectively.
In the limit n → ∞ the evolutionary game dynam-
ics of this system are well described by the replicator
equation [25]. The replicator is a deterministic equation
that, given a strategy composition, calculates the com-
position in the next generation. The replicator assumes
that strategies reproduce at a rate proportional to their
fitness. In its discrete form this equation reads:
ρ
′
c =
ρcWc
W
(4)
with a similar expression existing for the defector popu-
lation. To compute then the evolutionary history of the
population we repeatedly calculate the fitnesses and then
use the replicator equation to create the next generation
up until the point where ρ
′
c = ρc. At this point, and
in the absence of mutation, there is no further evolution
and the population is said to be in an evolutionary stable
state(ESS). The ESS may be monomorphic(one strat-
egy present) or polymorphic (coexisting populations).
If it is a polymorphic ESS then the different strategies
present in the population should be at fitness equilib-
rium. Since the prisoners dilemma is defined by the re-
lations T > R > P > S we have that Wd > Wc and
a population evolving under natural selection with no
mutation will eventually reach the monomorphic state
nc = 0, nd = 1.
In large networks of actors all possible pairs of interac-
tions are rarely present, so now consider a process that
in every subsequent round of the repeated game matches
each player with a randomly selected subset of the pop-
ulation. Then in the mean filed limit Wc = kρcR+ kρdS
and Wd = kρcT + kρdP , where k is the average number
of interactions per player. Repeated application of the
replicator equation will then again yield a population of
nd = n in this unstructured population. The question
arises then whether the existence of a polymorphic ESS
is possible in the prisoner’s dilemma and what are the
mechanisms that can bring it forth.
Here we maintain and evolve a population of pure
strategists linked by a network whose degree distribu-
tion evolves under an algorithm first introduced in [26].
In its original formulation a time step of the algotithm
consists of a stochastic death/birth proccess.
• Removal. Choose a node at random, with probabil-
ity 1
n
, and remove together with all its associated
edges
• Duplication. Choose a node at random, with prob-
ability 1
n−1 , this is the parent node. Introduce a
new offspring node and attach edges between the
node and the remaining n− 1 nodes in the follow-
ing way.
1. Attach the offspring to the parent with wiring
probability pp.
2. Attach the offspring to other non-parent nodes
with wiring probability po if an edge does not
exist between the parent and the other node.
33. Attach the offspring to other non-parent nodes
with wiring probability pe if an edge exists be-
tween the parent and the other node.
To the above algorithm we add selection, based on the
payoffs a node collects by playing against its neighbour-
hood, and also let offspring inherit the strategy from their
parent. In our simulations we let the population evolve
under tournament selection [27].In tournament selection
a subset of the population is selected at random and all
selected play against the nodes in their respective neigh-
bourhoods. Their cumulative payoffs are compared and
the node with the highest score parents a new offspring.
In our simulations the subset consists of two randomly
picked nodes, if they happen to have the same total payoff
we randomly select one to reproduce. While the repli-
cator Eq.( 4) is generational our tournament selection
only replaces a randomly selected individual with the
winner of the tournament. This means that one appli-
cation of the replicator should correspond on average to
n = pop.size death/birth cycles.
To initiate our system we cast a random network over
the population such that k = pon is the mean degree.
We also randomly and with equal probability assign a c
or d strategy to each individual. Concerning the payoffs
we also let T > R > P = S = 0 so that only coopera-
tive links have a positive effect on fitness, a choice that
does not alter the essential characteristics of the pris-
oner’s dilemma ( [8]).
If we set po = pe = 0, pp = 1 nodes will only interact
with their same strategy parent and the population will
settle in a nc = n state since R > P . On the other hand
letting pp = pe = 0 and 0 < p0 ≤ 1 the only stable equi-
librium is the nd = n state. Under our network dynamics
it is possible for a node to become isolated even if all the
wiring probabilities are greater than zero. This occurs
if a node has all of its neighbours progressively removed
through its lifetime by death events. An isolated node
has no payoff and selection is blind to its strategy since
the phenotype only expresses itself through the inclus-
sion of a node to a neighbourhood. Such a node can still
reproduce by chance (for example by being compared in
the tournament against another node only connected to
defectors)and re-attach itself to the network through its
offspring.
In this set of experiments we examine the parameter
set 0 < po << 1, pe = 0, pp = 1 which describes a world
where elements link up with their parent and a randomly
chosen subset of the population which we vary in size. In
this limit a node will on average end up with pon ran-
domly formed connections plus a link to its parent. The
node average degree will then be k = pon+ 1. The pop-
ulation structure introduced by the wiring probabilities
can then be expressed in the mean fitness calculations
as(excluding self interaction):
Wc = (k − 1)
nc − 1
n− 1
R+R (5)
for a cooperator and:
Wd = (k − 1)
nc
n− 1
T (6)
for a defector. Under natural selection for a polymorphic
population to exist the expected fitnesses of the two types
must be equal. Setting Wc = Wd we can calculate the
equilibrium cooperator density to be:
ρC =
n− k
n
R
(T −R)
(k − 1)−1 (7)
In the limit n→∞ we have (n−k)→ n and we conclude
that
ρC∞ =
R
(T −R)
(k − 1)−1 (8)
From Eq.( 8) we find that for (k − 1) < R
T−R then
ρc− > 1 whilst for ∞ > (k − 1) >
R
T−R we have coexis-
tence of the two types. We see then that an increasingly
randomized average degree can ’dilute’ the advantage of
the cooperative bond between parent and offspring with
the onset of coexistence defined by the game payoffs. As
is customary in the literature we can make an identifica-
tion between the language of Hamilton’s principle and the
prisoner’s dilemma payoffs by letting T = b, R = b − c,
P = 0 and S = −c . From this we conclude that co-
operation will prevail if k ≤ b/c. This result is in line
with Hamilton’s rule, frequent kin interactions promote
cooperation, and its network extension [28] which states
that networks of high connectance hamper cooperation
as the average degree is an inverse measure of genetic
relatedness.
Multiplying both sides of Eq.( 7) by k − 1 we get
ρC(k − 1) =
n− k
n
R
T −R
= kc = constant (9)
with the infinite version being:
kc∞ =
R
T −R
= constant (10)
Eqs. ( 9) and ( 10) represent the expected number of
cooperating links at fitness equilibrium an element will
form due to randomly sampling the population. Since
defectors can only acquire cooperator links through the
random sampling we also have that
kdc = kc =
R
T −R
(11)
which is the expected number of cooperators adjacent to
a defector. Cooperators also link to their parent so:
kcc = kdc + 1 =
R
T −R
+ 1 =
T
T −R
(12)
for the expected number of cooperators adjacent to a
cooperator. At equilibrium it should hold that Rkcc =
Tkdc so that kcc =
T
R
kdc.
4III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Co-existence properties and system size
dependence
In Fig.( 1) we present results for ρc as a function of
pon = k−1 from agent based simulations of systems with
n = 2000. To compute ρc we first average over 50 inde-
pendent realizations with different initial conditions and
then average again over the last 10 generations. As men-
tioned in [29] a finite population undergoing stochastic
replication with no mutation will eventually enter one
of its absorbing states, which in our case is ρc = 1 or
ρc = 0.The time to absorption however may be extremely
long and all we can do is measure the observables of this
pre-absorption transient. In what follows we will refer
to the pre-abrorption transient states as equilibrium and
focus on issues regarding the time to absorption in future
work. From Fig.( 1) we can see that the simulation ρc
is roughly in good agreement with the values calculated
from the mean field approximation Eq.( 7).For k− 1 < 5
there is no coexistence and the absorbing state is one
with ρc = 1, for k − 1 > 5 we have coexistence that ap-
proximates a power law as ρc ∝ (k − 1)
β with β ≈ −1.
Notice however from Fig.( 2) how simulation data for
n = 2000 systems always give a slightly higher coopera-
tor density for all degrees than Eq.( 7) predicts, whereas
for the n = 1000 systems the cooperator density is lower
than expected for high average degrees. By comparing
the two lines in Fig.( 2) we can also see how increasing
system size brings the simulation results closer and closer
to the mean field predictions.
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FIG. 1: Equilibrium cooperator density as a function of
k − 1 = [5, 7, 8, 10, 14, 20, 30, 40, 60, 80] in linear scale for sys-
tems with n = 2000. Simulation results (circle) and Eq.( 7)
prediction(star).
This invites us then to look at the behaviour of sys-
tems of even smaller size. In Fig.( 3) we show simulation
data for systems of size n = 400. As we can see these
systems approach the behaviour of an infinite system for
intermediate values of the average degree. For large(i.e.
k − 1 = 40) or small (i.e. k − 1 = 7) average degree,
where one of the two types has a large fitness advantage
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FIG. 2: Difference between simulation results and the predic-
tions of Eq. 7. n = 2000 dashed line and n = 1000 solid line.
The units on the y-axis are in percentage of cooperators in
the population.
over the other, the systems will fall into the absorbing
states ρc = 0 or ρc = 1 . For even smaller n = 100
systems,Fig.( 4), the effect is more pronounced and co-
existence is impossible.
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FIG. 3: Equilibrium cooperator density as a function of
k − 1 = [7, 8, 10, 14, 20, 30, 40, 60, 80] in linear scale for sys-
tems with n = 400. Simulation results (circle) and Eq.( 7)
prediction(star).
From the above we then conclude that our mean field
approximation is unable to account for size dependent
behaviour and can only provide a good approximation
for large systems. Eq.( 7) predicts that as we increase
system size we should approach the infinite system ρc
from below. Our data suggests that whether we approach
the infinite system ρc from below or above depends on
the average degree. As a first attemtpt to account for this
behaviourwe hypothesize that in smaller systems density
fluctuations bring forth the absorbing states ρc = 1 and
ρc = 0.
To this extent we perform a numerical iteration of the
discrete replicator, Eq.( 4) with the fitnesses of the two
types calulated by Eqs.( 5) and ( 6). In each step af-
ter the next generation densities have been calculated we
generate a Gaussian fluctuation with a mean of zero and
a standard deviation of σ which we then add to the co-
operator density and remove from the defector density
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FIG. 4: Equilibrium cooperator density as a function of
k − 1 = [7, 8, 10, 14, 20, 30, 40, 60, 80] in linear scale for sys-
tems with n = 100. Simulation results (circle) and Eq.( 7)
prediction(star). For k − 1 = 7, 8, 10 the ρc values do not
denote the average proportion of cooperators over the real-
izations but rather the frequency by which the state ρc = 1
appears.
(we call this a stochastic replicator). To calculate σ for
a given n we time average the standard deviation of ρc
over every generation and then ensemble average over our
number of realizations. This data suggests that σ ≈ 1
4
√
n
.
In Fig.( 5) we show a comparison of simulation data and
the numerical iteration of our stochastic replicator equa-
tion. Comparing the left and right image in the figure
we can see how the stochastic replicator reproduces the
monomorphic absorbing states for small n. Coexistence
starts as the systems get larger and the average degree
is at intermediate values. the fit between the output of
the stochastic replicator and our simulation data is not
perfect, for example for n = 100 and k − 1 = 14 the
simulation data give ρc = 0 while iteration of the repli-
cator gives ρc = 0.308. Sources of discrepancy between
the stochastic replicator and our death/birth dynamics
could be the generational versus sequential process and
also the selection method, tournament versus fitness pro-
portional (see [30]). This is to be determined in future
work.
To construct an iterative stochastic replicator, that
also explicitly incorporates the death/birth process, will
also require an iterative model for the evolution of the de-
gree distributions since there is a tight coupling between
fitness and network structure. This brings us neatly to
our next section.
B. Degree distributions
The degree distributions in our model are essentially
also fitness distributions. Hence an analysis of their equi-
librium and dynamical properties captures all the funda-
mentals of the evolving dynamical system. In this pa-
per we will briefly examine the distributions at the point
where the strategies are in fitness equilibrium. Future
work will concentrate on developing iterative coupled de-
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FIG. 5: Iteration of replicator equation with gaussian fluctua-
tions (left) and simulation data (right) for systems of different
sizes and average degrees. Both sets of data are averages over
60 experiments. The cooperator density is mapped to a linear
color index ranging from black (ρc = 0) to white (ρc = 1).
gree distribution and strategy models. Let us here intro-
duce the following notation:
• pc(k). The probability to find a cooperator with k
neighbours.
• pd(k). The probability to find a cooperator with k
neighbours.
• pc(kc). The probability to find a cooperator with
kc cooperator neighbours.
• pd(kc). The probability to find a defector with kc
cooperator neighbours.
• pc(kd). The probability to find a cooperator with
kd defector neighbours.
• pd(kd). The probability to find a defector with kc
defector neighbours.
In Fig.( 6) we show plots from our individual based
simulations for pc(k) and pd(k). As we can see there is
nothing to distinguish the two types in terms of their
neighbourhood size. In Fig.( 7) we show plots of pc(kc)
and pd(kc). We now see that pc(kc) and pd(kc) differ
from each other. Furthermore their shape and relative
position to each other remain invariant as ρc varies. This
invariance is a direct consequence of fitness equilibrium
since the degree distributions are essentially fitness dis-
tributions. We can check that the distributions satisfy a
coexisting population scenario by using the distribution
data to calculate the following probabilities:
• pnc,nc+1, the probability that the number of coop-
erators will increase by one.
• pnc,nc−1 = pnd,nd+1 the probability that the defec-
tor population will increase by one
• pncnc = nnd,nd the probability that the population
composition will remain the same.
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FIG. 6: pc(k) (star), pd(k) (point) for systems with N = 2000,
k = 15 and steady state ρc = 0.3718. The data points are
ensemble averages over 60 independent experiments.
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FIG. 7: pc(kc) (star), pd(kc) (point) for three different systems
with steady states characterised by ρc = 0.7355, ρc = 0.5206
and ρc = 0.3715. The data points are ensemble averages over
60 independent experiments.
These probabilities should satisfy:
pnc,nc+1 + pnd,nd+1 + pnc,nc = 1 (13)
In our death/birth dynamics four events can occur. A
cooperator can die with probability dc or be born with
bc, and a defector can die with dd or be born with bd.
This permits us to right the transition probabilities as:
• pnc,nc+1 = dd · bc
• pnc,nc−1 = dc · bd
• pnc,nc1 = dc · bc + dd · bd
The death probabilities for the two types are simply pro-
portional to their densities so that dc =
nc
n
and dd =
nd
n
.
When we select two elements to test for reproduction
the one with the highest total payoff reproduces with
probability 1. We will distinguish between the cases
where the two elements are of the same type and when
they are not. When the elements are of the same type
then, since there is no mutation, an element of that type
is added to the population. A cooperator will be born
through this event with probability nc(nc−1)
n(n−1) and a defec-
tor with probability nd(nd−1)
n(n−1) .
It is worthy to note that when we compare two in-
dividuals of the same type we could have just as well
allowed for the less fit to reproduce.This is because when
an individual is born all of its edges,except the one to the
parent, are created at random and what is inherited is
only the strategy. The situation becomes different if the
elements can inherit a portion of their links from their
parent (i.e. pe > 0). Then what is inherited is the type
plus the ’environment’ and it would matter whether we
allowed the fitter or the less fit individual to reproduce.
When we select two individuals of different type we
further distinguish between the cases where the individ-
uals have the same fitness and when they do not. When
they have the same fitness then we select one at random
to reproduce regardless of type. As mentioned previously
two elements of different type can have the same fitness
only when kcc
kdc
= R
T
, we can then write the probability of
an individual being born by chance after been selected
for the tournament together with another individual of
opposite type but equal fitness as.
beq =
1
2
∑
i=0
pc(
T
T −R
i)
nc
n
· pd(
R
T −R
i)
nd
n− 1
(14)
with i = 0, 1, 2, ..., int
{
n(T−R)
T
}
as before.
When we select a cooperator and a defector with dif-
ferent fitness values the individual with the highest fit-
ness will reproduce. This depends on where on their re-
spective degree distributions they sit in relation to each
other.A cooperator with 1 ≤ kcc ≤
R
T−R i can win a de-
fector if the defector has a kdc up to and including kcc−i.
We can then write the probability that a cooperator was
born because it won the tournament against a defector
as:
bcw = 2
∑
i
∑
kcc
pc(kcc)
nc
n
·
∑
kdc
pd(kdc)
nd
n− 1
(15)
The limits are
• i = 0, 1, 2, ..., int
{
n(T−R)
T
}
•
T
T−R (i− 1) ≤ kcc ≤
T
T−R i− 1
• 0 ≤ kdc ≤ kcc − i.
For a defector via a similar payoff argument we get
Pdw = 2
∑
i
∑
kdc
pd(kdc)
nd
n
·
∑
kcc
pc(kcc)
nc
n− 1
(16)
with limits
• i = 0, 1, 2, ..., int
{
n(T−R)
T
}
7•
T
T−R (i− 1) ≤ kdc ≤
T
T−R i− 1
• 0 ≤ kcc ≤ kdc + i− 1.
In table III B we have tabulated the birth and transi-
tion probabilities using the ensemble averaged pc(kc) and
pd(kc) from simulation data for systems with n = 2000.
As is evident the transition probabilities between the two
types are very close, also note how the birth probabilities
of the two types are very close to their respective den-
sities such that ρc
ρd
= bc
bd
.We thus conclude that for this
n our systems are indeed in fitness equilibrium and well
described by the mean field as in Eq.( 7).
k − 1 ρc/ρd bc/bd pnc,nc+1 pnd−>nd+1 pnc−>nc
7 2.7822 2.7872 0.1938 0.1934 0.6128
8 1.8121 1.8523 0.2232 0.2184 0.5584
10 1.0846 1.0810 0.2479 0.2488 0.5033
14 0.5913 0.5978 0.2340 0.2315 0.5345
20 0.3419 0.3409 0.1888 0.1893 0.6219
30 0.2024 0.2030 0.1401 0.1396 0.7203
40 0.1448 0.1472 0.1119 0.1101 0.7780
60 0.0894 0.0926 0.0777 0.0751 0.8471
TABLE I: densities of strategists together with birth and tran-
sition probabilities as a function of increasing average degree
for systems with N = 2000
Finally let us mention that armed with expressions for
the transition probabilities and a mean field set of equa-
tions that describe how the degree distributions change
after a death/birth event we will be able to iterate an
equation for the evolution of ρc of the form:
ρ
′
c = pnc,nc · ρc + pnc,nc+1 · (ρc +
1
n
) + pnc,nc−1 · (ρc −
1
n
)
(17)
C. The effect of strategy mutations
If we introduce mutations, such that the offspring can
have the opposite strategy from the parent with proba-
bility pm coexistence can persist indefinitely. The equi-
librium size dependent ρc then becomes:
ρc =
(n− k)R− pm(n− 1)(T +R)
n(k − 1)(T −R)
(18)
and as n− >∞
ρc =
R− pm(T +R)
(T −R)
(19)
In Fig.( 8) we show ρc for systems with n = 100 to-
gether with the mean field predictions of Eq.( 18).
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FIG. 8: Equilibrium cooperator density as a function of
k − 1 = [7, 8, 10, 14, 20, 30, 40, 60, 80] in linear scale for sys-
tems with n = 100. Simulation results (circle) and Eq.( 18)
prediction(star). There is a strategy mutation rate at birth
of pm = 0.01.
As we can see from the figure the introduction of pm
helps suppress the fluctuations that in small systems can
destroy co-existence completely (compare Figs.( 8) and
( 4)). Producing individuals of the opposite type has the
obvious effect of avoiding the absorbing states. Notice
that a mutant offspring can only benefit from the link
to the parent when the parent is a cooperator and the
offspring a defector. This suggests a mechanism for how
the mutations might regulate the fluctuations in density
that bring about the absorbing states. When there is a
majority of cooperators (in low average degree k environ-
ments) a mutant defector offspring will have a high fitness
compared to the average in the population, thus will be
more likely to reproduce. As defectors start to spread,
and link to their parents, they again start to have lower
average fitness compared to defectors since in the low k
environment defectors cannot amass the number of co-
operator neighbours they need to overcome the absence
of payoff from the link to their parent.On the other hand
when there is a defector majority a mutant cooperator
offspring will most likely have the same fitness as its par-
ent since S = P = 0, thus cooperators can spread due to
the parent-offspring link. When their numbers start to
rise cooperators are at a disadvantage again as the high
average degree enviroment spells their doom.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
To summarize we have showed how co-existing popu-
lations can persist in an ever changing dynamic environ-
ment. Our results are in line with Hamilton’s rule of kin
selection operating on a stochastically created network.
Moreover we have briefly touched on the role of pheno-
typic mutation and its ability to regulate co-existence in
smaller populations. We plan to continue our research in
the role of fluctuations, the influence of selection meth-
ods and creating a model for the evolution of the degree
distributions. Perhaps more importantly we plan to ex-
8amine systems with pe > 0. In this case the offspring
inherits a strategy and a set of succesfull relationships so
that selection acts as to preserve succesfull network units
and not just individual behaviours.
The authors kindly thank Chris Rhodes for help with
proofreading.
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